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PUNISIIlNG HATEFUL MOTIVES: OLD WINE 
IN A NEW BOTTLE REVIVES CALLS 
FOR PROHIBITION 
Carol S. Steiker* 
HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY Pouncs. By James B. 
Jacobs and Kimberly Potter. New York: Oxford University Press. 
1998. Pp. viii, 212. $24.95. 
"Hate crimes" are nothing new: crimes in which the victim is 
selected because of the victim's membership in some distinctive 
group (be it racial, ethnic, religious, or other) have been with us as 
long as such groups have coexisted within legal systems. What is 
relatively new is their recognition and designation as a discrete phe­
nomenon. But as appellations like "sexual harassment" and "com­
munity policing" have begun to teach us, words are only the 
beginning of the life cycle of a new socio-legal concept. What fol­
lows are debates about whether the new category is really a coher­
ent one, what activities should fall within and outside of it, what 
legal and social strategies should regulate these activities, and, inev­
itably, whether the whole thing was a good idea in the first place, 
given the consequences that followed. 
The concept of "hate crimes" would be cresting if it were a 
wave; to stick with the life-cycle metaphor, it is in the prime of its 
life. Legislators on both the federal and state levels are busy draft­
ing and debating new hate crime laws.1 Courts, including the 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Harvard Law School. 
A.B. 1982, Harvard-Radcliffe Colleges; J.D. 1986, Harvard Law School. - Ed. I thank Dan 
Kahan, Jordan Steiker, and Bill Stuntz for helpful suggestions. 
1. Jacobs and Potter report that by 1995, "the federal government, thirty-seven states, and 
the District of Columbia had passed hate crime laws that fall into four categories: (1) sen­
tence enhancements; (2) substantive crimes; (3) civil rights statutes; and (4) reporting stat­
utes." P. 29. Legislative initiatives to pass even more such laws continue. See, e.g., Reno 
Urges Expansion of Hate-Crime Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at A12. (discussing the 
progress of the White House's Hate Crimes Prevention Act in Congress); Hate Crime Penalty 
Adjustment Proposed, UPI, Jan. 25, 1999, available in LEXIS, UPI file. (describing the intro· 
duction of legislation in the California State Legislature that would make life in prison with­
out parole the penalty for all hate crime murders, regardless of whether the motivation was 
based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability). In the wake of the 
Sheppard murder in Laramie, Wyoming, see infra note 4, bills have been proposed in both 
Houses of the Wyoming legislature providing both for enhanced penalties and special report­
ing procedures in hate crime cases. See WY H.B. 117, 55th Wyoming Legislature, introduced 
January 13, 1999; WY H.B. 193, 55th Wyoming Legislature, introduced January 15, 1999; WY 
H.B. 206, 55th Wyoming Legislature, introduced January 15, 1999; WY S.B. 84, Wyoming 
55th Legislature, introduced January 14, 1999; WY S.B. 91, Wyoming 55th Legislature, intro­
duced January 14, 1999. In the wake of the Byrd homicide in Jasper, Texas, see infra note 5, 
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United States Supreme Court, have been called upon to rule on 
constitutional issues raised by such laws.2 Academics have been 
publishing articles and books on the topic at a furious rate.3 The 
general public has been continually engaged in the debate by the 
intense media attention the topic has attracted, especially in the 
wake of such high-profile crimes as the gruesome murders last year 
of Matthew Sheppard, an openly gay student at the University of 
Wyoming who was beaten, tied to a fence, and left to die by 
homophobic assailants;4 and of James Byrd, Jr., a black man who 
was chained to the back of a pickup truck and dragged to his death 
in Texas by ex-convicts with ties to white supremacist groups.5 Pro­
ponents of hate crime laws point to heinous crimes like these as 
evidence of the need for enhanced law enforcement tools; they ar­
gue that realization of our collective commitment to social equality 
depends on such government initiatives. Opponents of hate crime 
laws contend that general laws prohibiting assault, murder, and the 
like are sufficient for even the most egregious offenses and that the 
many costs of hate crime laws far outweigh their benefits. 
bills have been proposed in both Houses of the Texas legislature that would expand on the 
hate crime reporting and enforcement procedures already in place. See TX H.B. 868, Texas 
16th Legislature, introduced January 22, 1999; TX S.B. 439, Texas 76th Legislature, intro· 
duced February 8, 1999. 
2. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), revg. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 
807 (WIS. 1992); In re M.S., 876 P.2d 1365 (Cal. 1995); People v. Baker, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 372 
(Cal. 1993); Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Wyant, 597 
N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992), revd. by 624 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1994); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 
(Or. 1992) (en bane). 
3. In addition to the book that is the subject of this review, Harvard University Press has 
recently published FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAs CRIMES UNDER 
AMERICAN LAW, a comprehensive defense of hate crime laws. See also JACK LEVIN & JACK 
McDEvrrr, HATE CRIMES: THE RisING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED (1993); LU·IN 
WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW (1998); BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
LEGAL REsPoNSES (Robert J. Kelly ed., 1993); HATE CRIME: THE GLOBAL PoLmcs OF 
POLARIZATION (Robert J. Kelly & Jess Maghan eds., 1998); HATE CRIMES (Paul A. Winters 
ed., 1996). Major law review articles published in the last ten years are too numerous to list, 
but they probably peaked around 1993 with the Supreme Court's decision in the Mitchell case 
and two major symposia: Symposium, Hate Crimes, 199211993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 483 
(1993) and the Criminal Justice Ethics Symposium on Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes 
in 1992. 
4. See Associated Press, Task Force Urges Hate Crime Laws, BoSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 
1998, at AS; James Brooke, After Beating of Gay Man, Town Looks at Its Attitudes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at A12; Ruben Castaneda, Hate Crime Laws Rely on Motives, Not 
Targets: Laurel Slaying Illustrates Fine Line, WASH. PoST., Oct. 26, 1998, at Dl. 
5. See Rick Bragg, In Wake of Texas Killing, Black Militants and Klan Trade Words, Not 
Blows, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998, § 1, at 17; Rick Lyman, A Guilty Verdict in Texas Dragging 
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, § 4 (Week in Review), at 2; Michael Saul, City Urges Tight· 
ening State Hate-Crimes Law; Council Members Cite Wyoming, Jasper Cases, DALLAS MORN· 
ING NEws, Mar. 23, 1999, at 18A. 
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James B. Jacobs6 and Kimberly Potter7 emphatically add their 
voices to the latter chorus. Indeed, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law & 
Identity Politics often has something of the quality of an advocate's 
brief on the subject, in which it turns out that every conceivable 
argument in favor of hate crime legislation is simply wrong. Build­
ing on some of their earlier work, Jacobs and Potter examine hate 
crime laws from every possible angle and find nothing, except per­
haps good intentions, to recommend them (p. 145). The authors 
begin with conceptual difficulties in the use of hate crime as a cate­
gory. They elaborate on the challenges of defining prejudice and 
:figuring out which prejudices should be covered by hate crime laws 
(pp. 11-21). Moreover, even if these initial conceptual hurdles 
could be cleared, they argue, determining the causal relationship 
between prejudice and action is further fraught with problems (pp. 
21-27). Potter and Jacobs go on to argue that there really is no need 
for hate crime laws anyway, marshaling criminological research to 
contest claims that we are witnessing a hate crime "epidemic" (pp. 
45-64). A bit inconsistently, they then assert that there is nothing 
inherently worse about hate crimes than ordinary crimes committed 
without bias (implicitly suggesting that even an "epidemic" of hate 
crimes should not be a cause of special concern) (pp. 79-91). In 
addition to being unnecessary, contend Jacobs and Potter, hate 
crime laws are affirmatively harmful in that they pose serious 
problems of enforcement (pp. 92-93), violate the Constitution by 
punishing people for "politically incorrect opinions and viewpoints" 
(pp. 128, 111-29), and "undermine social solidarity" by reinforcing 
"identity politics" (pp. 144, 130-44). 
This is an impassioned book, both bene:fitted and burdened by 
the emotional investment that passion lends to analysis and advo­
cacy. On the debit side, Potter and Jacobs sometimes seem one­
sided in their presentation of controversies by not always present­
ing the arguments of their adversaries in the most fair or compelling 
fashion,8 or by requiring more empirical support from their adver­
saries than they are able to provide for their own policy prescrip-
6. Director of New York University's Center for Research in Crime and Justice, and Pro­
fessor of Law at New York University School of Law. 
7. Former Senior Research Fellow at New York University's Center for Research in 
Crime and Justice, now in private law practice in Bronxville, New York. 
8. For example, in their chapter on "The Politics of Hate Crime Laws" (Chapter 5), 
Jacobs and Potter suggest that the primary purpose of what they term "interest groups" in 
"lobbying" for hate crimes legislation is to "boost[ ] the morale and the status of the 
[identity-based advocacy] organizations and their constituencies." P. 66. This claim that pure 
self-interest has led victimized groups to embrace victimhood in order to "assert a moral 
claim to special entitlements and affirmative action" (p. 66) ignores the possibility that 
people of diverse identities migbt support hate crime laws (or affirmative action) on the basis 
of some principled view of what justice requires, rather than because of a prediction about 
how their own personal well-being migbt be enhanced. 
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tions.9 On the credit side, however, the book's comprehensive 
treatment of its subject is likely to give it broad appeal; the wide­
ranging scope of the arguments against hate crime laws assembled 
by Jacobs and Potter enhances the likelihood that the book will 
have some impact upon a diverse audience. Those who are not con­
vinced of the insurmountability of the conceptual problems might 
well find the empirical case against hate crime laws compelling, or 
the philosophical case, or the constitutional case, or the pragmatic 
case, based on the myriad issues raised by Jacobs and Potter regard­
ing investigation, litigation, and data collection in hate crime cases. 
Approaching the book without a passionate commitment of my 
own, but leaning by general inclination the other way, I found 
myself engaged, although not necessarily convinced, by many of its 
arguments. I certainly can say that I :finished the book considerably 
more thoughtful and, indeed, more troubled than when I began. 
Rather than attempt any comprehensive assessment of the dis­
parate arguments advanced in the book, I focus my attention here 
on one particular argument - that hate crime laws are unconstitu­
tional (and also a bad idea) because, by punishing disfavored dis­
criminatory motives for criminal acts, they impermissibly punish 
thought. This argument, the subject of Chapter Eight of Hate 
Crimes, is but one arrow in the authors' hefty quiver of arguments 
against hate crime legislation. I focus on it, however, partly because 
it is an argument opponents of hate crime laws advance with great 
frequency and vehemence, 10 and partly because I find this argu­
ment puzzling every time I come across it. By exploring the source 
of my puzzlement, I hope to advance two arguments of my own: 
first, that hate crime legislation is not a significant departure from 
the rest of the substantive criminal law, and second, that the failure 
9. For example, in their chapter on "Justification for Hate Crime Laws" (Chapter 6), 
Jacobs and Potter take to task supporters of hate crime legislation for failing to produce 
sufficient empirical support for their claims that hate crime victims suffer greater psycholo· 
gical and emotional injury than other victims (pp. 82-83) and that hate crimes cause unusually 
substantial harm to innocent third parties (pp. 86-87). In the same chapter, however, Jacobs 
and Potter argue against the need for greater deterrence of hate crimes by asserting rather 
vaguely that "it is not clear that the threat of a penalty enhancement will have any marginal 
deterrent effect" (p. 89). Similarly, they reject the "moral education" argument for hate 
crime legislation by stating simply "we think it unlikely that hate crime laws add much moral 
education to the huge body of denunciation of crime and prejudice that already exists" (p. 
91). Jacobs and Potter may be right on these last points, but you would not know it from 
their empirical support. 
10. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Pamela Moorshead, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases: Hate 
Crime Laws and the Supreme Court's Opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 30 GONZAGA L. REv. 
1, 27 (1994/95) ("Laws that target motives, particularly motives which are beliefs about issues 
like race, religion, or politics, threaten our constitutional right to believe what we will, re· 
gardless of how unfounded or offensive our beliefs might be."); Susan Gellman, Sticks and 
Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy 
Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333, 362 (1991) (arguing that hate 
crime laws "criminalize pure thought and opinion"). 
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of many commentators (Jacobs and Potter among them) to recog­
nize this continuity camouflages the extent to which the debate sur­
rounding hate crime laws is fundamentally grounded in differences 
about politics or political strategy. 
I. ARE HATE CRIME LAWS DIFFERENT FROM TIIE REST OF TIIE 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW? 
The argument that hate crime laws are unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment is based on a view of hate crime legislation as 
radically discontinuous with the rest of substantive criminal law. 
Under this view, hate crime laws represent a dangerous departure 
from the heartland of (appropriate) criminal prohibitions in that 
they punish speech and thought in much - or even exactly - the 
same way that laws directly criminalizing offensive expression do. 
Thus, the chapter that Jacobs and Potter devote to this argument 
begins with a discussion of the history and legal permissibility of so­
called "hate speech" regulation (pp. 112-21). Jacobs and Potter 
build up to the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in R.A. V. v. St. 
Paul, 11 in which the Court unanimously rejected as unconstitutional 
an ordinance criminalizing as a form of "disorderly conduct" the 
placing of symbols or graffiti like (but not limited to) "a burning 
cross or Nazi swastika" when one knows or should know that such 
symbols will cause offense "on the basis of race, color, creed, reli­
gion, or gender . . . ."12 The majority opinion for the Court 
"acknowledged that the government could criminalize constitution­
ally unprotected fighting words, but insisted that the government 
could not criminalize only those fighting words that express ideas 
that the government disfavors" (p. 124). For Jacobs and Potter, this 
reasoning rejecting a hate crime law that criminalized purely ex­
pressive behavior necessarily entails the rejection of hate crime 
laws that enhance the punishment of people who engage in criminal 
behavior when motivated by disfavored attitudes. 
Thus, Jacobs and Potter find the Supreme Court's 1993 decision 
in Wisconsin v. Mitchell13 both unfathomable and indefensible. In 
Mitchell, the Court - once again unanimously - upheld the con­
stitutionality of Wisconsin's hate crime statute authorizing an in­
creased sentence for any offender who intentionally selects a victim 
"because of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, na­
tional origin or ancestry."14 The Court distinguished its decision of 
the previous year on the ground that "whereas the ordinance struck 
down in R.A. V. was explicitly directed at expression (i.e., 'speech' 
11. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
12. 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting St. Paul city ordinance). 
13. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
14. 508 U.S. at 480 (quoting Wrsconsin statute). 
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or 'messages'), the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unpro­
tected by the First Amendment."15 To Jacobs and Potter, this dis­
tinction is wholly unconvincing because "the point remains that the 
sentence enhancement is triggered by some prejudices and not 
others. A similarly situated offender, who engaged in the same con­
duct, but for reasons of personal jealousy or spite, would have re­
ceived one-third the sentence that Mitchell received" (p. 126). 
Viewed in this way, through the lens of First Amendment limita­
tions on hate speech regulation, the Court's refusal to limit hate 
crime regulation in a similar fashion can seem oddly contradictory 
- an exercise in aridly formalistic line drawing, as Jacobs and 
Potter contend. But viewed through the lens of the substantive 
criminal law, it is the limitations urged by Jacobs and Potter - not 
the new hate crime laws - that seem oddly contradictory and out 
of sync. This is the source of my puzzlement each time I encounter 
arguments like those advanced by Jacobs and Potter. For it seems 
obvious that the criminal law frequently makes the definition of 
criminal offenses and sentencing options turn on some qualitative 
evaluation of the offender's reasons for acting. Indeed, the Mitchell 
Court buttressed its unanimous validation of Wisconsin's sentenc­
ing enhancement provision by invoking judges' "[t]raditional[ ]" 
consideration of "[t]he defendant's motive for committing the of­
fense" in making sentencing determinations.16 
Jacobs and Potter recognize that the Court "may have been con­
cerned that striking down the Wisconsin law would have put in 
doubt the constitutionality of all judicial sentencing based on mo­
tive" (p. 126). In contrast to some constitutional critics of hate 
crime laws,17 Jacobs and Potter do not go so far as to claim that 
motive should play no role in criminal liability. In their view, how­
ever, the Court's fear is nonetheless unfounded. According to 
Jacobs and Potter, the kind of motives placed at issue by hate crime 
laws are fundamentally different from those that the criminal law 
ordinarily makes relevant: 
Sentence enhancements for other motives often do not have the same 
free speech implications. Unlike greed, jealousy, or simple cold­
bloodedness, bigotry is often connected to a system of political beliefs 
and is never content neutral. The concepts of prejudice and bigotry 
are political to the core. Hate crime laws explicitly seek to punish 
people for having bigoted beliefs. The Supreme Court did not even 
begin to grapple with this issue. [p. 127] 
15. 508 U.S. at 487 (citations omitted). 
16. See 508 U.S. at 485 (citing general sources and going on to give specific examples 
from capital sentencing cases). 
17. See Gellman, supra note 10, at 364 ("Motive is nothing more than an actor's reason 
for acting, the 'why' as opposed to the 'what' of the conduct. Unlike purpose or intent, 
motive cannot be a criminal offense or an element of an offense.") (citations omitted). 
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Thus, the primary bone of contention between Jacobs and Potter on 
the one hand and the Mitchell Court on the other is this: Is the way 
in which hate crime laws make motive relevant to crime and pun­
ishment fundamentally the same or fundamentally different from 
the operation of the rest of our substantive criminal law? I will 
seek to elaborate upon the Court's intuition, which I share, that 
hate crime laws are essentially continuous with the basic structure 
of Anglo-American criminal law, and that a constitutional chal­
lenge to the one necessarily calls the other into question. 
Consider first the numerous criminal law doctrines that treat a 
defendant's reasons for acting as partially or wholly exculpatory. 
One of the best examples is the doctrine of mitigation in the law of 
homicide. In general, the grading of homicides could be fairly 
described as "stair-cased" based on degrees of intentionality, as 
opposed to motive. That is, the law of homicide generally inquires 
as to the degree to which the defendant chose to kill rather than the 
defendant's reason for killing. Thus, first-degree murder is tradi­
tionally murder that is "premeditated," while ordinary murder is 
only intended or even super-reckless, and involuntary manslaughter 
is merely ordinarily reckless or criminally negligent.18 In contrast 
to this formal focus on intentionality, the category of voluntary 
manslaughter is reserved for those killings that would otherwise be 
murder based on the degree of intentionality present, but that are 
mitigated by the existence of the defendant's "heat of passion" 
caused by "reasonable provocation."19 The traditional, common 
law view of adequate provocation included only a small number of 
"paradigms of misbehavior"20 that could serve to mitigate the kill­
ing of the provoker; these were: "(1) an aggravated assault or bat­
tery; (2) mutual combat; (3) commission of a serious crime against a 
close relative of the defendant; (4) illegal arrest; and (5) observa­
tion by a husband of his wife committing adultery."21 Modem An­
glo-American law has softened the rigidity of the common law 
categories by often delegating to the jury the decision as to what 
constitutes adequate provocation.2  Modem juries are generally in­
structed along the lines that provocation is sufficient if it "might 
render ordinary men, of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly 
or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion, rather 
than judgment .... "23 The rationale usually offered for this partial 
18. See WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw §§ 7.1-7.4, 7.7, 7.12 
(2d ed. 1986). 
19. See id. § 7.10. 
20. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.07(B)(2)(a) (2d ed. 
1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
21. Id. (citation omitted). 
22. See id. § 31.07(B)(2)(b )(i). 
23. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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defense to bring it in line with the ostensible focus of the rest of 
homicide law is that it downgrades certain homicides based on the 
impairment of the defendant's volition brought about by the emo­
tion aroused by the provoking event.24 
Two recent scholarly articles, however, persuasively demon­
strate that this volitional view of "heat of passion" manslaughter is 
simply inadequate. Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum mount a 
comprehensive argument rejecting such a "mechanistic" account of 
the law of provocation (as well as a wide variety of other criminal 
law doctrines) in favor of an "evaluative" conception of the role of 
emotion in criminal liability.25 In addition, Victoria Nourse has of­
fered a devastating unmasking and critique of the evaluative judg­
ments that lie just beneath the surface of the law of provocation and 
passion.26 Both of these articles elaborate upon the way in which 
the law of voluntary manslaughter "focuses on motives"27 and 
makes normative evaluations of those motives. While Kahan and 
Nussbaum's project is largely to demonstrate and defend the exist­
ence of evaluation in the law of voluntary manslaughter (and the 
criminal law generally), Nourse goes on to critique the substance of 
the law's evaluation of motives in the manslaughter context. 
Nourse compellingly demonstrates the way in which modem under­
standings of provocation and passion "have actually helped to en­
trench norms about relationships,"28 creating "a murder law that is 
both illiberal and often perverse. "29 
The relevance of a defendant's motive to criminal liability is not 
by any means limited to the context of voluntary manslaughter, 
although this doctrine presents an especially good vantage point 
from which to consider the issue. On the contrary, a great many 
other criminal law doctrines share this feature. Kahan and 
Nussbaum's article goes on to develop their argument about the 
criminal law's evaluative stance toward emotion in a number of 
other doctrinal contexts, including the doctrines of premeditated 
murder, self-defense, duress, involuntary act, and insanity.30 To 
24. See id.; Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 Moo. 
L. REv. 467, 479-80 (1988). 
25. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 305-06 (1996). 
26. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the Provocation 
Defense, 106 YALE LJ. 1331 (1997). 
27. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 315. 
28. Nourse, supra note 26, at 1337. 
29. Id. at 1332. 
30. Other scholars have made similar arguments about the significance of motive to crim­
inal liability. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role 
of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635, 747 ("This Article 
has argued that the evil motive concept of mens rea plays a vital role within the context of 
certain narrowly defined defenses but is generally undesirable at the offense definition 
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their list, I would add the more general defense of necessity, of 
which self-defense might be seen as a subspecies. In all of these 
contexts, the law makes criminal liability (or, in the law of premedi­
tation, the grade of criminal liability) tum on some normative eval­
uation of the defendant's reasons for acting. Determinations about 
which motivations are good ones or bad ones are deeply inscribed 
in the law itself. 
If this general argument is right - that the existence or degree 
of criminal liability often turns on some normative evaluation of a 
defendant's motive that is inscribed or "written into" the law -
what does it entail for Jacobs and Potter's argument that hate crime 
laws punish motive in an impermissible way? Is the way hate crime 
laws consider motive different in some important way from how, 
say, the law of voluntary manslaughter does? Jacobs and Potter 
contend that the motive singled out for special punishment by hate 
crime laws - they call it "bigotry" - is different from other mo­
tives, because "[u]nlike greed, jealousy, or simple cold-bloodedness, 
bigotry is often connected to a system of political beliefs and is 
never content neutral" (p. 127). But this argument does not seem 
to distinguish between the motives of defendants who kill in the 
"heat of passion" but without w:hat the law accepts as adequate 
provocation and the motives of those who commit hate crimes. Im­
agine, under either the traditional common law categories or mod­
em, liberalized provocation law, the claim of "heat of passion" by a 
white supremacist who becomes enraged and kills when he discov­
ers that his daughter is romantically involved with a black man. 
Clearly, such a discovery does not come even close to one of the 
narrow categories of "adequate provocation" developed by the 
common law. Even in a modem jurisdiction with a liberalized prov­
ocation doctrine, a jury would likely conclude that the provoking 
event was not one that would move a man "of fair average disposi­
tion" to violence. Thus, the white supremacist gets punished more 
- and considerably more, given that his crime is now murder 
rather than manslaughter - because his racist attitudes are not 
ones that the law recognizes as mitigating. Had he found his wife in 
bed with another man (black or white), he would have a classic 
partial defense of "heat of passion" based on adequate provocation. 
level."); Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 CRIM. JusT. ETHICS, Wmter/ 
Spring 1989, at 3, 5 (1989) ("I will argue that motive is relevant to criminal liability according 
to virtually any conception of motive that satisfies the most minimal criteria of adequacy.") 
(emphasis in original); Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character, or 
Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURv. OF AM. L. 605, 605 ("I will argue that motive ought to 
be and commonly is, notwithstanding the claims to the contrary, an element in determining 
liability or grade of offense."). The definitions of "motive" offered by these scholars is simi­
lar in all salient respects to Kahan and Nussbaum's definition of "emotion;" indeed, Kahan 
and Nussbaum sometimes refer to "motive" as synonymous with "emotion." See, e.g., Kahan 
& Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 315. 
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The law's choice to mitigate the latter killing itself inscribes, as 
Nourse teaches us, deeply held views about the proper roles of men 
and women in intimate relationships.31 Viewed in this way, the doc­
trine of "adequate provocation" appears to be exactly what Jacobs 
and Potter decry about hate crimes legislation - "political to the 
core" (p. 127). 
It is a bit difficult to come up with a precise parallel to the oper­
ation of hate crime laws in the manslaughter (or other defense) 
context: legal defenses mitigate or forego punishment based on a 
less culpable motive, while hate crime laws aggravate or impose 
punishment based on a more culpable one. But the law of sentenc­
ing is consonant with the law of criminal liability. Just as the exist­
ence or degree of criminal liability can often turn on a normative 
evaluation of the defendant's reasons for acting, so too the degree 
of punishment imposed after a finding of criminal liability often 
turns on such an evaluation. The clearest examples of this tendency 
are in the capital sentencing context, because constitutional con­
straints on the imposition of the death penalty have led legislatures 
to specify those circumstances that "aggravate" a murder so as to 
make the defendant eligible for this punishment.32 As the Supreme 
Court recognized in Mitchell, the death penalty is "surely the most 
severe 'enhancement' of all."33 Death penalty statutes routinely 
designate as aggravating circumstances motives for killing that are 
considered worse than the usual motives a defendant might have 
for committing a crime of violence. 
The Mitchell Court gave as its primary example the fact that 
many states treat murder committed for pecuniary gain as aggra­
vated murder for which the defendant becomes death-eligible.34 
One opponent of hate crime laws attempted to rebut this argument 
by suggesting that "murder for hire is a different act than other 
murder; the state is not seeking to punish or deter the motive of 
profit-seeking, but the medial end of creating contracts to kill."35 
The problem with this argument is that if states really were primar­
ily concerned with punishing "contracts to kill," it would be odd 
indeed to phrase the aggravating factor as "murder for pecuniary 
31. See Nourse, supra note 26, at 1332 ("[O]ur most modem and enlightened legal ideal 
of 'passion' reflects, and thus perpetuates, ideas about men, women, and their relationships 
that society long ago abandoned."). 
32. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding the wholly discretionary capital 
punishment system that prevailed throughout the United States violative of the Eighth 
Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding a new capital punishment 
scheme that guided sentencer discretion through the use of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances). 
33. 508 U.S. 476, 486 (1993). 
34. See 508 U.S. at 485 (citing capital statutes from Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, and Wyoming). 
35. Gellman, supra note 10, at 365. 
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gain." This latter locution would not necessarily include within its 
ambit the solicitor of the contract who initiates it and pays the ac­
tual killer, because such a solicitor might well be acting not for pe­
cuniary gain at all, but rather engaging in an act of terrorism, or 
jealously eliminating a rival lover, or settling an old score. It makes 
much more sense to view the prevalent "pecuniary gain" aggravator 
as inscribing the belief that killing for money is simply worse than 
killing for some other reason. 
But although the Mitchell Court saw that the "pecuniary gain" 
aggravator supported its argument about the enhancement of pun­
ishment based on motive, it oddly neglected the best examples in 
capital punishment law of aggravating factors that designate certain 
motivations as worse than others. A common aggravating factor in 
state death penalty schemes asks whether the murder was "espe­
cially heinous, cruel or depraved."36 The Arizona Supreme Court 
interpreted "depraved" murder to mean murder where "the perpe­
trator 'relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion' 
or 'shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evi­
dences a sense of pleasure' in the killing."37 In another case involv­
ing the interpretation of this aggravating factor, the Arizona Court 
elaborated: "Heinous and depraved involve the mental state and 
attitude of the perpetrator as reflected in his words and actions .. .. 
'[D]epraved' means 'marked by debasement, corruption, perversion 
or deterioration.'"38 In Idaho, the death penalty statute permits the 
finding of an aggravating circumstance when "the defendant exhib­
ited utter disregard for human life,"39 which the Idaho Supreme 
Court interpreted to mean when the defendant acted as a "cold­
blooded, pitiless slayer.''40 In upholding this construction against 
charges of excessive vagueness, the United States Supreme Court 
explained, "The terms 'cold-blooded' and 'pitiless' describe the de­
fendant's state of mind: not his mens rea, but his attitude toward 
his conduct and his victim.''41 Every aggravating factor of this gen­
eral type is frankly evaluative of the defendant's reasons for com­
mitting the underlying killing and of the defendant's attitude 
toward his victim and his act. Although this sort of aggravating fac-
36. This is the language of Arizona's statute, Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) 
(1989), although different states have other, similar locutions. Aggravating factors of this 
type were first proposed and are probably based upon the Model Penal Code's formulation. 
MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 210.6(3)(h) (Complete Text as Adopted 1962) ("The murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."). 
37. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990) (quoting 769 P.2d 1017, 1033 (Ariz. 1989) 
(en bane)). 
38. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 769-70 (1990) (quoting State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 
1105, 1130 (Ariz. 1983) (citations omitted)). 
39. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) (1997). 
40. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 472 (1993) (quoting 105 Idaho 362, 370 (1983)). 
41. 507 U.S. at 473. 
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tor has been constitutionally controversial, that conflict has re­
volved around the potential breadth and vagueness of such factors 
rather than their inherently evaluative nature. 
It is hard to see how the valuations of defendants' reasons for 
acting embodied in these death penalty statutes are any less "polit­
ical" than the negative valuation of "bigotry" to which Jacobs and 
Potter object. The enhancement for killing that brings "pleasure" 
punishes the sexual sadist, or the killer who derives special satisfac­
tion from killing a particular sort of victim (very much along the 
lines of a hate crime law). The enhancement for killing "coldly" or 
without "pity" punishes the terrorist or political activist who kills as 
the calculated means toward a political end more than the jealous 
husband or jilted lover. Even if there would be First Amendment 
concerns raised by punishment for the expression of violent, sadistic 
fantasies or for the expression of satisfaction at the prospect of 
harm or death to certain disfavored people or groups, enhanced 
punishment for killings done for such reasons are commonplace in 
our law. 
Moreover, even if Jacobs and Potter were still to insist that there 
is something different and special about punishment for "bigoted" 
motives, it is and has always been commonplace - in noncapital as 
well as capital cases - to punish what we now call "hate crimes" 
more than ordinary assaults or murder, even before a single hate 
crime law was ever passed. In discretionary sentencing regimes, 
which completely dominated the American sentencing scene until 
quite recently and remain quite prevalent today, judges have wide 
latitude to take into account all of the circumstances of a crime in 
determining an appropriate penalty from what is often a very wide 
range of permissible ones. As one classic treatise on criminal law 
puts it: "Motives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the 
defendant's sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant to 
receive a minimum sentence because he was acting \vith good mo­
tives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad motives."42 The 
whole point of discretionary sentencing is to permit the sentencer to 
take into account the relevant differences between crimes that the 
formal offense definition of necessity leaves out, and very often dif­
ferences in offender motivation fall into this category. Although 
discretionary sentencing schemes have become less favored in re­
cent years, with the federal government and a substantial minority 
of states turning to sentencing guidelines,43 the primary legislative 
purpose behind limiting judicial sentencing discretion has not been 
to eliminate the sentencer's consideration of motive, but rather to 
42. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 18, § 3.6(b). 
43. See generally Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 
JUDICATURE 173 (1995). 
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standardize sentencing in order to avoid disparities.44 Thus, both 
traditional discretionary sentencing and the growing trend in guide­
lines sentencing envision a role for the consideration of offender 
motivation in sentencing. 
Quite apart from judicial sentencing discretion, prosecutorial 
charging discretion also has traditionally permitted the differentia­
tion of punishment based upon offender motivation. It is axiomatic 
in American law that "the American prosecutor has complete dis­
cretion with respect to the selection of the charge. He can charge 
the most serious offense or offenses, or charge one or more less 
serious offenses. "45' The exercise of prosecutorial discretion of 
course involves a number of considerations, many of which are un­
related to offender motive, such as resource considerations and 
cooperation agreements. The prosecutor, however, will also con­
sider "a great many different kinds of defendant-specific or case­
specific factors"46 in determining whether or what to charge, and 
these facts will necessarily include an evaluation of the defendant's 
motives for committing the underlying offense, if they are evident 
from the information available to the prosecutor. In contrast to the 
movement to reduce or eliminate sentencing discretion, no success­
ful institutional reform movement has limited in any substantial 
way the charging discretion of prosecutors; indeed, many commen­
tators have argued that recent limitations on sentencing discretion 
have actually increased the amount and the significance of the pros­
ecutor's discretion in charging.47 Thus, the very structure of our 
44. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1336, 
1336 (1997) (describing and critiquing the Federal Sentencing Commission's "central preoc­
cupation" with "reducing sentencing disparity"). Tue best evidence that the Federal Sentenc­
ing Guidelines were meant not to eradicate but rather to standardize the consideration of 
evidence of motive is the addition of § 3Al.1 by the Commission in response to the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which provides for a three-level upward 
adjustment in the offense level where the defendant "intentionally selected any victim or any 
property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived race, 
color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any per­
son." This particular "hate crime motivation" adjustment reflects a particular application of 
the Guidelines' more general command that "relevant conduct" be taken into account at 
sentencing, relevant conduct being defined as 
"acts or omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or by a person for 
whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable, that (1) are part of the same course 
of conduct, or a common scheme or plan, as the offense of conviction, or (2) are relevant 
to the defendant's state of mind or motive in committing the offense of conviction, or (3) 
indicate the defendant's degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood." 
§ 1Bl.3(a) (as amended Nov. 1998) (italics added). 
45. Norman Abrams, Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discretion, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIME & JUSTICE 1272, 1275 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
46. Id. at 1274. 
47. See, e.g., William J. Powell & Michael T. Camino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 373 
(1995); Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 
Nw. U. L. REv. 1247 (1997). 
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institutions of criminal justice deliberately create opportunities for 
the exercise of discretion in determining the appropriate punish­
ment for an offender based on offender motivation. These institu­
tional arrangements only add to my sense that it is Jacobs and 
Potter, rather than hate crime laws, that are out of step with the 
administration of criminal justice in our country today. 
II. W"HY Do HATE CRIME LAWS SEEM DIFFERENT? 
If hate crime laws do not treat defendants' motives differently 
from the way much of the criminal law and the criminal justice sys­
tem do, why is it that Jacobs and Potter, among many others, per­
ceive something fundamentally different about such legislation? 
1his is another puzzle to me, the answer to which Inight help ad­
vance the current debate about the wisdom and efficacy of hate 
crime laws. My sense is that hate crime laws Inight appear to be 
new and different because the ways in which the rest of the criminal 
law deals with disfavored motivation are hidden and hard to see. I 
do not mean to suggest that the drafters of our current criminal law 
codes or the generations of common law judges who developed the 
foundations of our substantive criminal law intended to obscure the 
true nature of their enterprise. Rather, I mean to suggest that cer­
tain kinds of motivations were, and perhaps still are, so widely ac­
cepted as Initigating or aggravating that the ways in which these 
evaluations are written into the law do not seem like "evaluations" 
at all. Rather, we Inight say that these evaluations simply "are" the 
law. It is only when we attempt to inscribe new evaluations of moti­
vation into the law, evaluations that are more contested than the 
ones already long woven into the law's fabric, that we are able to 
see clearly the act of evaluation at all. 
Victoria Nourse has recently written a wonderful review of 
James Q. Wilson's book on the so-called "abuse excuse"48 in which 
she powerfully demonstrates how Wilson's calls for "moral judg­
ment" in the criminal law lead him to criticize new kinds of de­
fenses (such as the claims of battered women) without seeing how 
more "traditional" defenses (such as the law of provocation) are 
identical in their underlying structure to the ones he excoriates.49 
Says Nourse: "If Wilson is to take judgment seriously, he cannot 
indict some defenses for failing to judge - demanding that bat­
tered women, for example, show more self-control - but not 
others - partially excusing provoked men precisely when they do 
48. JAMES Q. WILSON, MoRAL JUDGMENT: DoES THE ABusE Excuss THREATEN OuR 
LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997). 
49. See Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of 
Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. Rsv. 1435 (1998). 
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lose self-control."50 Wilson's inability to see that his defense of the 
"traditional" law of provocation was a kind of "abuse excuse" itself, 
arose from the uncontroversial nature of that traditional (partial) 
excuse. For instance, men who were provoked by their wives' adul­
tery to commit homicide did not need expert witnesses to testify 
about "cuckolded husband syndrome" precisely because it was 
taken for granted by the law (and society) that any "reasonable" 
person would be moved to violent anger by such an experience. It 
is only when law reformers seek to write in new judgments about 
reasonableness that the evaluative nature of the criminal law ap­
pears prominent and, necessarily, controversial. 
But what, one might ask, is so new and controversial about the 
evaluations that hate crime laws seek to add formally to the crimi­
nal law? No one, and certainly not Jacobs or Potter, argues that 
racial hatred (or other group-based animosity) is a social good. So 
why should the negative valuation of such motivations in the crimi­
nal law be so controversial? The first reason is the one that Jacobs 
and Potter explicitly offer through their arguments about the consti­
tutionality of hate crime laws: the criminal law should not "punish 
people for [their] beliefs" (p. 127). The ways in which the criminal 
law already does punish belief (by punishing disfavored reasons for 
acting) are sometimes hard to see and apparently were not seen by 
Jacobs and Potter. Thus, they would likely argue that the extent to , 
which the criminal law ever punishes belief in a way similar to hate 
crime laws is similarly problematic. Their argument against hate 
crime laws would necessarily extend to all valuations of motive by 
the substantive criminal law. So, at the most open and obvious 
level, hate crime laws are problematic for Jacobs and Potter be­
cause they threaten a conception of the criminal law as "content 
neutral" - to use a phrase that Jacobs and Potter borrow from First 
Amendment law (p. 127). Jacobs and Potter seek to protect and 
promote a criminal law that is "neutral" as to reasons for and atti­
tudes about action, punishing only in accordance with the intent to 
bring about certain proscribed harms. The normative attractiveness 
of this conception of criminal law is an important question, one that 
is very much engaged by recent scholars of substantive criminal law, 
some of whom, in the words of Victoria Nourse, have posited a 
"new normativity."51 But as these scholars have amply demon­
strated, normative evaluation of reasons for action - of belief and 
attitude - are hardly foreign to the criminal law as it now exists 
and as it has long existed. Thus, to bar the door at hate crime laws 
is a bit like barricading a house against an intruder who is already in 
the living room with his feet up: the controversy over "content neu-
50. Id. at 1438. 
51. Id. at 1456. 
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trality" should not start with hate crime laws, but with the law of 
homicide through and through, as the earlier examples indicate. 
A second, less obvious reason why hate crime legislation seems 
so new and controversial is that its strategy for combating racial 
hatred is deeply controversial in our society right now. While the 
disfavoring of racial and other group-based hatreds is not itself con­
troversial, the appropriate means for combating such attitudes are 
very much contested. Many - Jacobs and Potter clearly included 
- question the wisdom and efficacy of strong group affiliations and 
group-based policies on the grounds that such affiliations and poli­
cies narrow identities and produce perverse incentives. These sorts 
of concerns are evident in the very title of Jacobs and Potter's book, 
which implies that hate crime laws are the product of what the au­
thors term "identity politics." They define "identity politics" as "a 
politics whereby individuals relate to one another as members of 
competing groups based upon characteristics like race, gender, reli­
gion, and sexual orientation" (p. 5). This definition reveals its 
clearly pejorative nature in the use of the word "competing" - to 
Jacobs and Potter, strong identification with an identity group im­
plies a kind of zero-sum game. They go on to explain how such 
"identity politics" create perverse incentives: "According to the 
logic of identity politics, it is strategically advantageous to be recog­
nized as disadvantaged and victimized .... The ironic consequence 
is that minority groups no longer boast about successes for fear that 
success will make them unworthy of political attention" (p. 5). 
What Jacobs and Potter fear most is that the recognition and de­
ployment of group identities through law will ultimately serve to 
"harden and exacerbate social divisions" (p. 10). 
It is this second, more subtle controversy that I believe lies at 
the heart of Jacobs and Potter's book. This controversy - about 
the uses and abuses of group identity by law - explains both why 
Jacobs and Potter see hate crime laws as so fundamentally different 
from the rest of criminal law and why they are so passionate in their 
attack on hate crime legislation. It might also explain why the de­
bate over hate crimes laws should occupy a central place on our 
political agenda, rather than be fought out on the more arid battle­
field of constitutional doctrine. 
III. CONCLUSION: WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
Jacobs and Potter have written a telling book in two senses of 
the word. First, the book makes a number of telling points about 
deficiencies in the theory and practice of hate crime legislation from 
a number of different perspectives - moral, political, and pru­
dential. In particular, Jacobs and Potter's elaboration of the con­
ceptual issues that remain unresolved in the debate over hate crime 
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laws and their concern about the difficulties inherent in addressing 
them is well-presented. Should gender be a hate crime category? 
How can one tell whether violent crimes against women are com­
mitted "because" the victim is a woman? Are all rapes hate 
crimes? (pp. 19-20). Moreover, Jacobs and Potter's suggestion that, 
given the demographics of violent crime, hate crime laws might pri­
marily affect blacks who victimize whites (pp. 16-17), is an impor­
tant warning about the possibilities of unintended consequences. 
The book, however, is even more telling in a different sense. 
The inability or unwillingness of opponents of hate crime legislation 
to see such laws as essentially continuous with much of the rest of 
the criminal law reveals the extent to which race (or group) con­
sciousness is contested as a strategy for racial (or group) equality in 
our society. It is this controversy that makes the lack of "content 
neutrality" of hate crime laws visible, even as the normativity of the 
rest of the criminal law remains shrouded. 
Once this controversy is brought to the surface, the debate 
about hate crime laws should take its place next to debates about 
affirmative action, single-sex education, and other debates about 
group consciousness as a strategy for achieving group equality in 
our society. Much of the constitutional debate about hate crime 
legislation might be viewed more profitably in these terms. 
